Russian Naval Transit and GNSS Disruption in the Western Mediterranean: An OSINT Assessment (February 2026)

Executive Summary

Open-source maritime tracking data in mid-February 2026 indicates the westward transit of a Russian naval task grouping through the Central Mediterranean toward the Strait of Gibraltar. The formation included the landing ship RFS Aleksandr Otrakovsky operating in proximity to the commercially flagged cargo vessel S

parta IV. (By @key2med)

Concurrently, commercial GNSS monitoring platforms recorded significant GPS degradation across portions of the Alboran Sea. The timing and geographic alignment between the vessels’ track and the interference patterns raise questions regarding the potential use of electronic warfare measures during the transit phase.

This article examines the movement pattern, the dual-use configuration of naval and commercial assets, and the implications of suspected jamming activity for NATO maritime domain awareness in the Western Mediterranean.

Strategic Context: The Gibraltar Transit

The Strait of Gibraltar remains one of the world’s most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Atlantic Ocean. Any military transit through this corridor—particularly by non-littoral powers—inevitably attracts monitoring by regional and alliance ISR assets.

In February 2026, open-source vessel tracking services identified the coordinated westward movement of a Russian Project 775 Ropucha-class landing ship alongside the cargo vessel Sparta IV. The pairing is consistent with previously observed Russian logistical patterns combining gray-hull naval platforms with civilian-flagged transport ships.

The reported destination of the formation was Kaliningrad, implying a reinforcement or redeployment cycle between Mediterranean-based assets and the Baltic theater. Such inter-fleet maneuvering underscores Moscow’s continued capacity to shift heavy equipment across maritime theaters despite sustained Western monitoring.

Task Group Composition and Operational Pattern

The presence of RFS Aleksandr Otrakovsky, a vessel traditionally assigned to the Northern Fleet, alongside a general cargo ship warrants analytical attention.

Project 775 landing ships are optimized for transporting armored vehicles, heavy equipment, and personnel. Historically, similar platforms have supported Russian logistical rotations between mainland ports and the naval facility in Tartus, which functions as Moscow’s principal Mediterranean logistics hub.

The commercial vessel Sparta IV has previously appeared in open-source reporting concerning Russian military-linked cargo transfers. While commercially flagged ships provide plausible deniability and reduce scrutiny thresholds in peacetime transits, their integration with naval escorts forms what analysts often describe as a “dual-track configuration.”

In practical terms, this setup enables:

• Increased cargo lift capacity.

• Layered physical protection.

• Enhanced command-and-control resilience.

• Greater complexity for the recognized maritime picture (RMP).

AIS data during the transit remained generally available, though minor reporting gaps were observed. These did not constitute a prolonged AIS blackout, but intermittent latency or position irregularities are consistent with operations conducted in electronically contested environments.

Movement Timeline: Central Mediterranean to Western Approaches

Open-source tracking indicates the formation originated in the Central Mediterranean, proceeding westward south of Sardinia before entering the Tyrrhenian–Alboran transit corridor.

Between 12 and 14 February, as the group approached the North African coastline, multiple commercial GNSS interference monitoring services registered elevated disruption levels. On 14 February, Sparta IV was observed maintaining moderate transit speed consistent with coordinated naval movement.

By 15 February, the group was reported entering the Strait of Gibraltar traffic separation scheme, a high-visibility environment routinely monitored by European coastal authorities and allied ISR frameworks.

The movement itself was not covert. Rather, its visibility may have been strategic—demonstrating Russia’s continued maritime reach from the Mediterranean toward the Baltic region and reinforcing the operational flexibility of the Baltic Fleet.

GNSS Interference in the Alboran Sea

The most analytically significant development during this transit was the reported degradation of GNSS integrity across portions of the Alboran Sea.

Commercially available interference tracking platforms recorded:

• Elevated loss-of-lock events on civilian L1/L2 frequencies.

• Concentrated disruption zones along segments of the North African littoral.

• Intermittent anomalies in positional reliability.

The intensity level—categorized in some datasets as “high interference”—suggested more than incidental signal noise. In several instances, maritime receivers reportedly experienced degraded accuracy sufficient to affect navigation redundancy systems.

While causation cannot be definitively attributed using open sources alone, the geographic overlap between interference clusters and the task group’s trajectory is notable.

Jamming vs. Spoofing: Analytical Considerations

Two principal forms of GNSS disruption are typically evaluated in such contexts:

1. Jamming – Overpowering satellite signals, resulting in denial of service.

2. Spoofing – Broadcasting false signals to manipulate receiver positioning.

Available OSINT indicators during the reporting window primarily suggest jamming behavior (signal denial) rather than widespread spoofing (false coordinate injection). However, isolated anomalies in positional data could indicate limited spoofing tests or directional interference beams.

From an intelligence perspective, temporary GNSS degradation during naval transit can serve several purposes:

• Reducing the precision of commercial maritime tracking.

• Complicating ISR fusion relying on GNSS-referenced metadata.

• Testing electronic warfare readiness in a real-world environment.

It is important to emphasize that civilian maritime traffic density in the Western Mediterranean makes sustained large-scale spoofing operationally risky. The observed pattern instead aligns with localized, time-bound interference.

Possible Intent: ISR Degradation Near European Littorals

The timing of interference as the task group approached waters adjacent to Spain and Italy invites further assessment.

Both coastlines fall within areas of dense surveillance coverage and routine NATO maritime patrol operations. Degrading GNSS reliability—even temporarily—could affect certain layers of ISR data collection, particularly where commercial tracking, open-source aggregation tools, or GNSS-dependent metadata tagging are involved.

While military-grade systems often rely on encrypted or hardened navigation inputs, civil GNSS disruption can still create peripheral blind spots within the broader maritime domain awareness architecture of NATO member states.

A moderate-confidence assessment would therefore consider the possibility that the interference served an operational security function—reducing data granularity during a politically sensitive transit—rather than constituting a purely technical anomaly.

Broader Implications for Maritime Domain Awareness

The February 2026 transit illustrates three emerging dynamics:

1. Integrated Naval-Commercial LogisticsRussia continues to leverage commercially flagged vessels in conjunction with amphibious platforms to expand logistical throughput and strategic ambiguity.

2. Routine Electronic Warfare SignalingGNSS disruption appears increasingly normalized as part of naval maneuver doctrine, particularly during chokepoint transits.

3. Contested Electromagnetic Environment in the MediterraneanThe Western Mediterranean is no longer a permissive environment from an electromagnetic perspective. Even short-duration interference events highlight vulnerabilities in civil-military data fusion systems.

For European coastal states and alliance planners, the key takeaway is not the singular transit itself, but the integration of kinetic movement and non-kinetic electronic effects within the same operational envelope.

Conclusion

The February 2026 westbound transit of a Russian amphibious–commercial pairing through the Strait of Gibraltar, combined with contemporaneous GNSS interference in the Alboran Sea, reflects a pattern consistent with modern hybrid naval maneuver.

Open-source indicators do not conclusively attribute the interference to the task group. However, the spatial and temporal alignment supports a moderate-confidence assessment that electronic warfare measures may have accompanied the movement.

As maritime competition intensifies, chokepoints such as Gibraltar will likely remain focal points not only for visible naval deployments, but also for invisible electromagnetic contestation. Monitoring both dimensions—steel hulls and signal spectra—will be essential for maintaining an accurate maritime domain picture in the years ahead.